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Abstract. The digital economy has substantially reduced market frictions but also
posed new challenges for the e¢cient functioning of markets. In particular, the drastic
reductions of costs for search, entry, transportation, and reproduction have profound
implications on the role of platforms, the value of innovation, and the balance between
rms data needs and consumer privacy. I review some recent economic research that
sheds light on these issues, and discuss how well-designed policies on competition,
regulation, IP protection, and consumer privacy can improve market performance in
the digital economy.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The digital economy is sometimes dened narrowly as economic activities in the
information and communication technology (ICT) sector, which includes telecommu-
nications, the Internet, IT services, hardware and software. The broad denition of
the digital economy includes the combined value of ICT production and digital inputs
to the rest of the economy. Because of the di¤erences in the dention, there are dif-
ferent estimates about the size of the digital economy. In 2017, the narrowly-dened
digital economy accounted for about 6.9 percent of the GDP in the U.S., 6 percent
of the GDP in China, and 4.5 percent of the GDP in the global economy; whereas
based on the broad denition, the respective numbers were 21.6 percent in the U.S.,
30 percent in China, and 15.5 percent globally (2019 Digital Economy Reprot, United
Nations). Despite the di¤erences in the denition and measurement, there is no doubt
that the digital economy is impacting every aspect of our lives. In fact, if we consider
the digital economy as encompassing all economic activities that use or are facilitated
by digitized data, then it is essentially the entire economy.1
New digital technology and the Internet have drastically reduced the costs of search,
entry, transportation, and reproduction, unleashing enormous potentials for enhanc-
ing economic e¢ciency (Goldfarb and Tucker, 2019). At the same time, these cost
changes raise new challenges for the organization of markets, especially because of
their profound impacts on the role of platforms, the value and protection of innova-
tion, and the trade o¤ between rms data usage and consumer privacy. In this paper,
1The transformational impact of digitalization can also be seen from the changing composition of
the top 20 companies in the world. Among them, measured in market capitalization, the percentage
of technology and consumer services rose from 16% in 2009 to 56% in 2018, while the oil and gas and
mining sector fell from 36% to 7% over the same period. Four of the top 10 rms in 2018 were not
even among the top 100 in 2009: Amazon, Alibaba, Facebook and Tencent (2019 Digital Economy
Reprot, United Nations).
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I review the insights from some recent studies on the opportunities and challenges in
the digital economy, especially on issues related to platforms, innovation, and con-
sumer data, and discuss how well-designed policies can improve market performance.
One crucial feature of the digital economy is the growing importance of platforms
and platform-enabled products/services. A platforms is basically an intermediary
for transactions. With the reduction in consumer search cost on the Internet, one
might think that there is diminished need for intermediaries. However, the Internet
has also substantially lowered entry and consumer search costs, which has greatly
expanded the size of markets and increased the number of rms a consumer can
access. The lower entry cost may also lead to a reduction of average rm quality
in the market, as entry becomes protable also for low-quality rms. Platforms
thus become especially valuable as information intermediaries in the digital economy.
Recent research has shown that by coordinating and guiding consumer search, a search
platform can improve market e¢ciency (e.g., Athey and Ellison 2011; Chen and He,
2011). However, a platform may have distorted incentives when, for instance, it is
partially vertically integrated (e.g., de Cornière and Taylor, 2014; White, 2013; Chen
and Zhang, 2018).A platform may also perform poorly in guiding consumer search
when product quality is not (perfectly) observable. Due to network e¤ects and other
factors, platforms often possess enormous market power and may abuse their market
dominance. I will discuss how instruments such as competition policy and product
liability can have positive welfare impacts by aligning the interests of platforms and
consumers.
Digitization has greatly increased the value of innovation and the need for intellec-
tual property (IP) protection. This is especially true because many digital products
have the distinctive property of low reproduction and transportation costs. Therefore,
on the one hand, it is feasible and e¢cient for one rm to serve a large market with an
innovative product, so that the innovation becomes more valuable; while on the other
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hand, strong intellectual property rightsparticularly patent protectionis needed
in order to deter imitation and provide desirable innovation incentives. The literature
on the economics of innovation has devoted increasingly more attention to sequential
or cumulative innovation, where the e¤ects of patent policy are very di¤erent from
those for a single innovation. I will focus on two recent studies that yield new in-
sights on how patent policy may improve an industrys performance in innovation.
Chen, Pan, and Zhang (2018) analyze how patentability standard impacts the rate
and direction of innovation, where the rate of industry innovation is shown to vary
with patentability standard in an inverted-U shape. Chen and Sappington (2018)
study the optimal rule for patent infringement damages in a sequential innovation
environment. As I shall also discuss, as the values of innovation rise and the costs of
imitation fall, IP protection and innovation will play vital roles for economic develop-
ment in the digital age. Furthermore, the increase in IP protection and the reduction
in search cost increase the e¢ciency of the market for technology, giving rise to more
external innovation rather than internal innovation.
Equipped with digital technology to gather and store data, rms now have enor-
mous capability to learn about consumer preferences and utilize such knowledge in
their business activities. Some consumer data, such as those with information to
open an account with a rm, are obviously needed to facilitate transactions. Con-
sumer data can also be useful for rms to provide better products. For example,
information about consumers and consumer demand can help rms to design and
produce new or better products. Personalized information may also help rms to
provide products that better match consumer needs or reduce consumer search cost,
possibly through product recommendations or targeted advertising. However, con-
sumer information collected by rms can also potentially harm consumers, for at least
three reasons. First, rms may use consumer purchase history to engage in price dis-
crimination (e.g., Chen, 1997; Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000). Second, consumers may
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have an intrinsic preference for privacy and hence su¤er from the collection of their
personal information by rms. Third, data breaches can leak sensitive personal infor-
mation and harm consumers. Recent research in economics has o¤ered new insights
on the potential trade o¤ in protecting consumer data and on the optimal design of
regulatory policies.
The enormous impact of products and services enabled by digital technology/digital
data is in full display during the Covid-19 pandemic. At the time of writing, many
schools and universities have gone online for teaching and learning. A vast number of
business meetings and academic conferences are being held online, which has led to
substantial increases in stock prices for companies that provide virtual meeting plat-
forms such as Zoom Video Communications Inc., amidst large declines of the overall
stock market. Remote working, through the Internet, is occuring in an unprecedented
large scale. Online shopping for groceries and online ordering for restaurants, while
having already provided much conveniences before, are a necessity for many people
during the pandemic. Online provision of healthcare services and virtual doctor ap-
pointments are becoming a common practice. Clearly, the digital economy has played
a crucial role in the supply of goods and services during the pandemic,2 and it will
be the driving force for economic growth in the new normal afterwards.
In the rest of the paper, I discuss platforms and how to improve platform markets
in Section 2. The rising values for innovation, the design of optimal patent policy
in the digital age, as well as issues related to external vs. internal innovaiton, are
discussed in Section 3. Consumer data and privacy policy are discussed in Section 4.
I conclude in Section 5.
2According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, while Chinas GDP decreased 6.8%
in the rst quarter of 2020 compared to the last year, its digital economy component, the
communication, software, and information technology service sector, actually increased 13.2%
(http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/202004/t20200417_1739602.html.).
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2. PLATFORMS AS INFORMATION INTERMEDIARIES
Consumers often need to incur search costs to nd product and price information.
Intermediaries have long existed to reduce such costs and facilitate transactions. For
example, shopping malls have traditionally served as intermediaries for consumers
who search for products from di¤erent sellers. As transactions are increasingly medi-
ated through digital technology and the Internet, consumers can access products at
lower search costs. Will the lower search costs in the digital economy reduce the need
for intermediaries? To answer this, one must recognize that digitization and the In-
ternet have also greatly expanded the market, and consumers now face a much larger
set of sellers to choose from. This market size e¤ect appears to be the dominant force,
making intermediaries more valuable for facilitating transactions between sellers and
products in the digital economy. This has led to the enormous commercial successes
of platform companies such as Google, Amazon, Alibaba, and Tencent.
There are di¤erent ways in which platforms operate. For example, Googles search
engine provides sponsored links to sellers who win keyword auctions. A seller makes
a payment to Google when a consumer clicks the sellers link, regardless of whether
and how much the consumer purchases from the seller. On the other hand, an online
marketplace may host various sellers, each of whom could be charged a xed hosting
fee (e.g., by Yelp SeatMe to each restaurant for reservations) or a commission as a
percentage of the transaction amount (e.g., by Expedia for a hotel booking). An online
store like Amazon is both a multi-product retailer and a marketplace for independent
sellers: it sells various products by itself while hosting independent sellers as an
intermediary.
Athey and Ellison (2011) and Chen and He (2011) are early contributions that
explore the role of platforms as information intermediaries guiding consumer search.
In their models, a platform has a certain number of advertising positions that are
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available to sellers through auctions, and the sellers are placed on the platform in the
order of their bids. The sellers di¤er in quality, with a higher-quality seller o¤ering a
product that is more likely to meet a consumers need. A sellers quality is its private
information. Each consumer must incur a search cost to visit a seller, through which
the consumer uncovers whether the sellers product is a match for her. In equilibrium,
a higher-quality seller is willing to bid more for placement at a higher position on the
platform, because he expects that a consumer searching his site is more likely to nd
a match and make a purchase. Moreover, sellers set the same price because each
consumer has the same value for her matched product even if it is sold by di¤erent
sellers. Anticipating the sellers strategy and their paid placements, consumers have
the incentive to visit sellers sequentially in the descending order of their positions
on the platform. The platform thus e¤ectively acts a coordination device, enabling
consumers to search more e¢cientlynding a match with less expected search cost
and enabling high-quality sellers to reach more customers.3
In Athey-Ellison and Chen-He, position auctions by the platform provide e¢cient
sorting of sellers. Subsequent research has relaxed some of their assumptions in
several directions. For instance, several authors have considered the possibility that
the platform has bias when guiding consumer search, possibly because it is (partially)
vertically integrated and wishes to direct consumers to its own products away from
competitors o¤erings (e.g., Burguet, Caminal, and Ellman, 2015; de Cornière and
Taylor, 2014; White, 2013). In fact, Google was accused of having acted illegally by
giving priority placement in search results to its own shopping service, while relegating
results from rivals to areas where potential buyers were much less likely to click. It
was ned e2.4 billion ($2.7 billion) for violation of antitrust law by the European
Commission (Reuters, June 27, 2017).
3Bagwell and Ramey (1994) pioneered the idea of coordination economies in retail markets with
consumer search.
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Because of the tremendous market power that platforms possess, antitrust agencies
have taken actions to prevent exclusionary practices by them in order to preserve
competition. In addition to bias in displaying search results, another controversial
issue is product bundling. Bundling is often a protable business strategy, partly
because it reduces the dispersion of consumer valuations, enabling rms to extract
more consumer surplus (Chen and Riordan, 2013). But bundling by a dominant
rm can also foreclose competition. In 2018, Google was ned a record-breaking
e4.3 billion ($5 billion) by EU regulators for breaking antitrust laws. The European
Commission states that Google has abused its Android market dominance in three key
areas, including its bundling of the search engine and Chrome apps into the operating
system (The New York Times, June 18, 2018).
Another direction to extend the analyses in Athey-Ellison and Chen-He is to relax
their assumption that consumers can observe product quality when they search the
rm. That is, instead of assuming products to be inspection goods, we need to con-
sider them as experience goods in many situations, especially for online purchases
where the quality of a product may not be learned before purchase. As Chen, Li, and
Zhang (2020) demonstrate, a decrease in consumer search cost for experience goods
can then reduce consumer and total welfare, because the resulting low price/prot
will reduce the gain from the reputation of being a high-quality seller, which in turn
lowers rms incentive to invest in product quality. For experience goods, a platform
may no longer be able to perform e¢cient sorting of sellers, because a low-quality
seller may potentially receive a higher prot from attracting a consumer. This can
potentially explain why online markets tend to have, on average, lower product qual-
ity than traditional brick-and-mortar stores. For example, in a recent investigation
by the U.S. Government Accountability O¢ce (GAO), 20 of the 47 products pur-
chased from third-party sellers on 5 popular consumer websites, including Amazon
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and Walmart, were counterfeits.4
Apparently, in the example above the online platforms have not been e¤ective in
sorting out the counterfeit sellers. Part of the problem is how to motivate a platform
to exert more e¤ort to deter sellers of fake/low-quality products. Reputation can be
a mechanism to motivate the platform to act as a responsible gatekeeper on product
quality. While some of the sellers are short-term players that may have a low
incentive to establish reputation, the platform can be the long-term player with a
stronger reputation to establish and protect For reputation to work well, however,
consumers will need to have choices from competition, which may be limited due to
the dominant market positions of some platforms. But even with competition, the
reputation mechanism can be fragile and does not provide su¢cient incentives, and
product liability can be an e¤ective incentive mechanism. In fact, competition and
the desired product liability may possibly exhibit a non-monotonic relationship (e.g.,
Chen and Hua, 2017), and it could be desirable to impose product liability not just
on sellers, but also on the platform.
The problem of low-quality sellers and products in the online market is also related
to the low entry cost in these markets. As Chen and Zhang (2018) show in a model of
search markets with both vertically and horizontally di¤erentiated rms, the average
quality of sellers in a search market becomes lower when entry cost decreases. They
identify two opposing e¤ects of an increase in entry cost: it raises the average rm
quality in the market, positively impacting welfare; but it also reduces the product
varieties in the market, diminishing consumers search options. Chen and Zhang show
that, under plausible conditions, the quality e¤ect dominates when entry cost is low,
so that consumer surplus and social welfare both initially rise with search cost, even
4All 47 items purchased were advertised as new, brand-name items sold by independent sellers
with average customer ratings above 90 percent, and all items were shipped from U.S. addresses (
GAO-18-216, January 2018).
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though they eventually fall. This suggests that in the digital economy, in which entry
barrier is very low for many markets, regulations that impose entry restrictions could
improve market performance. The increase in entry costs, possibly in the form of a
licensing fee, a certication of qualications, or a minimum quality standard. can
raise product quality and boost both consumer and total welfare.
3. INNOVATION AND IP PROTECTION
As market expands with digitization, a new product can reach more consumers and
have higher demand. This potentially increases the value of innovation, suggesting
one possible reason for the apparent acceleration of worldwide innovations in recent
years, measured by the number of patent applications. In 2017, innovators around the
world led 3.17 million patent applications (43% of them from China), representing
an eighth consecutive year of growth. There were 13.72 million patents in force
worldwide in 2017, of which around 2.98 million were in force in the U.S., 2.1 million
in China, and 2 million in Japan (WIPO, 2019).
Digital products often have low reproduction cost, even though they may require
substantial up-front investment. This suggests that intellectual property rights (IPRs)
can be crucial for promoting innovation in the digital economy. A central issue for
innovation economics in the digital economy thus concerns how to protect IP rights,
especially how to design optimal patent policies when innovations are cumulative in
nature, with current innovations building on past ones.
Chen, Pan, and Zhang (2018) investigate how patent policy, specically patentabil-
ity standards, may a¤ect the rate and direction of cumulative innovation in an indus-
try where rms can conduct R&D in multiple directions.5 They consider a situation
where there are two research directions, A and B, for a sequence of innovations (or
5The study of R&D direction under comulative innovation has attracted the attention of several
authors recently. See Bryan and Lemus (2017) and Hopenhayn and Squintani (2016).
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new products) that deliver higher product qualities over time. An innovation in direc-
tion B produces a quality improvement of stochastic sizes ranging from low to high,
whereas an innovation in direction A produces a more certain quality improvement
with an intermediate size. They consider the range of patentability standards (S)
under which innovations in direction A are always patentable while an innovation in
direction B is patentable only if its realized quality improvement is su¢ciently large.
Thus, A is the safe R&D direction and B the risky direction.
If innovation were a one-time activity that ends with the successful introduction of
a new product, a (marginal) increase in the patentability standard would discourage
R&D in the risky direction by making it harder to obtain a patent through this
direction, generating the threshold e¤ect. However, if innovation is cumulative, with
challengers conducting R&D that may lead to a follow-up innovation that replaces the
current leader, a higher patentability standard increases the value of being a leader
because it will take longer before the leader is replaced by a successful challenger. This
incumbency-prolonging e¤ect can potentially increase the incentive for R&D in both
innovation directions, because challenges will receive higher rewards from succeeding
in a patentable innovation.
Moreover, the changes in the R&D incentives in the two directions will interact
with each other. In particular, an increase of R&D in one direction induces the next
innovation discovery to come sooner, which lowers the prot from incumbency and
thus reduces the incentive for R&D in the other direction. Conversely, a decrease
of R&D in one direction has the opposite e¤ect. As Chen, Pan, and Zhang demon-
strate, this dynamic strategic substitution e¤ect between the two directions, together
with the incumbency-prolonging e¤ect, leads to novel e¤ects of patentability stan-
dards on innovation. Specically, as patentability standards rise, the industry rate
of innovation initially goes up and eventually falls down, reaching its maximum at
some intermediate level; and R&D intensity in the risky direction exhibits a similar
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pattern. Furthermore, industry R&D is biased towards (against) the risky direction
under lower (higher) patentability standards.
The cumulative nature of innovation also raises new issues for another aspect of
optimal patent policy: how to levy nancial penalties (damages) for patent in-
fringement. The design of damages for patent infringement is particularly subtle
in the presence of cumulative (or sequential) innovation. While stringent damage
rules can encourage early innovators, they may discourage subsequent innovation,
especially when it is uncertain about whether follow-on innovations infringe earlier
patents.6
Chen and Sappington (2018) present a model in which innovation is not certain be-
cause of stochastic variation in the costs required for innovations. Patent protection
also is uncertain in their model. Hundreds of thousands of patents are granted an-
nually, and patent descriptions can be vague and incomplete. Therefore, in practice,
it is often di¢cult to determine whether an innovation infringes an existing patent.7
They use the parameter  2 (0; 1 ] to denote the probability that the patent of an
initial innovator, rm 1, is infringed by the di¤erentiated product of a follow-on in-
novator, rm 2. The value of  can be viewed as a measure of the strength of patent
protection (e.g., Choi, 1998; and Farrell and Shapiro, 2008). Departing from the prior
literature that has primarily analyzed individual damage rules that are employed in
practice, including the lost prot (LP) rule and the unjust enrichment (UE) rule,
Chen and Sappington analyze the optimal design of patent damage rules when the
6Todays smartphones are estimated to embody innovations protected by as many as 250,000
patents that have been developed from cumulative innovations (Sparapani, 2015).
7The recent protracted patent infringement ligation between Apple and Samsung provides an
illustration for this point (e.g., Vascellaro, 2012). Lemley and Shapiro (2005) report that the U.S.
Patent and Trademark O¢ce issues nearly 200,000 patents annually. With rather limited time that
a patent o¢cer can devote to assessing the merits of an individual patent application, the validity
of a patent. may be successfully contested in court.
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initial innovators patent may be infringed by the follow-on innovator.
The LP rule requires the infringer to compensate the patent holder for the reduction
in prot the latter su¤ers due to the infringement, whereas the UE rule requires the
infringer to deliver its realized prot to the patent holder (e.g., Choi, 2009). Chen
and Sappington consider damage rules that are linear combinations of LP and UE,
coupled with a lump-sum transfer between the innovators. Under a linear rule, if rm
2 is found to have infringed rm 1s patent, rm 2 is required to deliver a damage
payment (D) to rm 1 that has three components: a lump sum monetary payment
(m), a fraction (d1) of the amount by which rm 2s operation reduces rm 1s prot,
and a fraction (d2) of rm 2s prot. Thus, linear rules generalize the LP rule and the
UE rule, including the former (with d1 = 1 and m = d2 = 0) and the latter (with
d2 = 1 and m = d1 = 0) as special cases.
Despite its simplicity, Chen and Sappington show that an optimally-designed lin-
ear rule achieves the highest welfare among all balanced damage rules (in which all
payments are internal to the industry). This is the case because linear rules allow
substantial control over the key determinants of welfare. Specically, the selected
values of d1 and d2 a¤ect pricing decisions, and thereby inuence the allocation of
industry output between the suppliers. The values of d1 and d2 also a¤ect total in-
dustry prot and their allocations between the suppliers to inuence their innovation
activities. The lump-sum payment (m) facilitates the desired allocation of industry
prot. The optimal linear rule typically di¤ers from both the LP and UE rules, and
often results in a substantial increase in welfare relative to both of them. Further-
more, the optimal linear rule can ensure the rst-best outcome, under which each
rm innovates if and only if its innovation enhances welfare and industry output is
also allocated e¢ciently. In this case, the optimal linear rule resembles more the LP
rule than the UE rule (so d1 > d2) when consumers value the product of the initial
innovator relatively highly, while it resembles more the UE rule (so d2 > d1) when
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consumers value rm 2s product relatively highly.8
The discussion of optimal patent policy has largely focused on the strength of
patent protection, Remarkably, the optimal linear rule maximizes welfare among all
balanced rules, regardless of the strength of protection for rm 1s patent (i.e., for
any given  > 0). This suggests that the design of damages for patent infringement
may play an especially important role in fostering cumulative innovations.
The optimal IP policy may di¤er for countries at di¤erent development stages.
One prominent view among economists (e.g., Helpman, 1993) has been that strong IP
protection mostly serves the interests of the developed countries (the North)which
are the primary producers of innovationsand does not benet developing countries
(the South). Chen and Puttitanum (2005), however, argue that IP protection and
innovation are also important for developing countries, even though technologies in
the South may di¤er from those from the North. In Chen and Puttitanum, successful
economic development is viewed itself a process to advance innovation capabilities and
to establish institutions that respect property rights. Their theoretical and empirical
results suggest that the optimal IP protection in developing countries, while weaker
initially, will gradually increase towards the standards in the developed world. The
rapid development of the Chinese economy, with its growing emphasis on innovation
and IP protection in more recent years as it becomes the country with the most patent
applications in the world, is an interesting case in point. In digital economy, with the
rising values of innovation and the decreasing costs of imitation, IP protection and
innovation will play increasingly important roles for economic development.
The digital economy also brings about signicant changes to how R&D and inno-
vation are organized. Firms can choose to pursue an innovation either internally or
8By inducing the rms to partially internalize each others prot, which inuences their pric-
ing strategies, the optimal linear rule shifts equilibrium industry output toward the product that
consumers value most highly.
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externally. Internal innovation allows the rm to fully utilize its own R&D resources
and to achieve better coordination of R&D and production, but it places (more server)
limitations on innovation opportunities and successes. External innovation, through
mechanisms such as acquisitions, partnerships, joint ventures, and licensing, furnishes
a larger set of innovation opportunities, but may have higher transaction costs. As
innovation proliferates, search frictions fall, and IP protection strengthens, the market
for innovation and technology transfer becomes both more needed and more e¢cient
in the digital economy. This has led to a shift in the pattern of innovation towards
external innovation. According to a study by the Boston Consulting Group,9 compa-
nies are increasingly using acquisitions and corporate venture capital to acquire new
ideas and technologies from startups and other external sources. Cisco Systems, for
example, has maintained its lead in networking technology in part by making more
than 175 acquisitions betwee 1993 and 2016. Facebook paid a total of $3 billion for
Instagram and Oculus VR. Gilead Sciences $11 billion acquisition of Pharmasset was
pivotal for the development of breakthrough treatments for hepatitis C. Some of the
largest technology companies have fueled their growth through acquisitions. For ex-
ample, between its founding in 1998 and January 2020, Google made 240 acquisitions.
The increased importance of external innovation is not without concerns and con-
troversies, especially when the acquistion of innovation from a (potential) rival nega-
tively impacts competition. In February 2020, the Federal Trade Commission issued
special orders to ve large technology rms, Alphabet (including Google), Amazon,
Apple, Facebook, and Microsoft, requiring them to provide information about prior
acquisitions not reported to the antitrust agencies. The orders will help the FTC
deepen its understanding of large technology rms acquisition activity, including
...whether large tech companies are making potentially anticompetitive acquisitions
9Bringing Outside Innovation Inside (2017), https://www.bcg.com/publications/2017/growth-
bringing-outside-innovation-inside.aspx
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of nascent or potential competitors...10 While the acquisition of a potential rival may
decrease competition, the issue of how strict antitrust restrictions should be on ac-
quisitions in innovative industries is actually more complicated. Startups are driven
to innovate and are able to receive VC funding, partly because there is the prospect
for them to be acquired when they succeed in investing in risky innovations. Restrc-
tions on acqusitions could adversely a¤ect the innovation incentive by startups. The
design of policies that both encourage innovation and promote competition remains
a challenging task for economic researchers and policy makers.11
4. CONSUMER DATA AND PRIVACY PROTECTION
A central part of the digital economy is digital technologies to gather and store
data. In recent years, we have witnessed an exponential growth in digital data over
the Internet. Global Internet Protocol tra¢c, a proxy for data ows, has grown dra-
matically from 100 GB per day in 1992 to 46,600 GB per second in 2017, and is
expected to grow to 150,700 GB per second in 2022 (2019 Digital Economy Reprot,
United Nations). Firms have greatly expanded their use of big data analytics, arti-
cial intelligence, and digital platforms to develop new products and serve consumers.
Access to data and the capability to utilize data have become essential for the com-
petitiveness of rms in the digital economy. The growing ability of rms to analyse
and process massive amounts of data, in particular, is crucial to the developments
10FTC to Examine Past Acquisitions by Large Technology Companies,
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/02/ftc-examine-past-acquisitions-large-
technology-companies.
11As Gilbert and Newbery (1982) initially point out, an incumbent possesses a higher value for an
innovation than a potential rival. Chen (2000) shows how the strategic relations between the new
and existing technologies may determine whether the incumbent will nd it more protable than a
new competitor to acquire the external innovation.
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in articial intelligence (AI). AI is already in use in areas such as voice recognition,
automation, and robotics. Together with new technologies such as 5G and new com-
putational power, AI will make self-driving cars a reality. It has been estimated that
AI has the potential to generate additional global economic output of around $13
trillion by 2030, contributing an additional 1.2 per cent to annual GDP growth (2019
Digital Economy Reprot, United Nations).
Firms have various ways to learn about consumer preferences, possibly using infor-
mation about a consumers personal characteristics, her past purchases, her purchases
of other products, and so on. Some of the consumer information, such as a consumers
name and address, is often needed for opening an account with a merchant and to facil-
itate transactions. Information can also be useful for rms to provide better products.
For example, information about consumers and consumer demand can help rms to
design and provide new or better products, such as self-driving cars. Individualized
information may also help rms to o¤er products that better match customer needs
or reduce consumer search cost, such as through product recommendations. How-
ever, consumer information collected by rms may also harm consumers, for at least
three possible reasons. First, rms may use consumer purchase history to engage in
price discrimination (e.g., Chen, 1997; Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000).12 Second, con-
sumers may have an intrinsic preference for privacy, which is infringed by rms data
collection (e.g., Acquisti, Taylor and Wagman, 2016). Third, data breaches, which
nowadays occur quite frequently, can cause substantial consumer harm.13
12History-based price discrimination is a widely-observed business practice in the digital age. For
example, phone companies and banks ofte o¤er new-customer discounts that discriminate against
repeat purchasers, whereas airlines o¤er loyalty programs that reward repeat customers. After
making a purchase from an online retailer, customers may receive a discount from the retailer for
the next purchase.
13A recent survey found that, in 2016, 15.4 million U.S. consumers su¤ered from identity theft and
fraud with a total loss of about $16 billion. See the survey report at Javelin Strategy & Research:
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How to balance the data needs of the digital economy and consumer privacy con-
cerns? Economic analysis can inform policy choices on this critical issue.14 Con-
sider rst how price discriminationor more generally di¤erential pricing (DP)
may a¤ect consumers and social welfare. Traditionally, economists have focused on
demand-based di¤erential pricing classic third degree price discriminationfor dif-
ferent consumer groups. But in many situations, di¤erential pricing for a product
is at least partially motivated by di¤erences in the (marginal) cost to serve di¤erent
groups of consumers. As shown in Chen and Schwartz (2015), the welfare e¤ects of
cost-based DP di¤er markedly from those of demand-based DP. Specically, while
demand-based DP tends to raise average market price and lower consumer welfare,
cost-based DP has no such tendency and will increase aggregate consumer surplus
for a broad class of demand functions. Therefore, to evaluate the potential welfare
e¤ects of a rms access to personal data for the purpose of di¤erential pricing across
consumer groups, it is imperative to distinguish between data for learning about cost
of service versus about demand elasticity, with data for cost information being less
likely to have detrimental e¤ects.
Firms have been developing innovative marketing methods to learn about consumer
preference. While some of these e¤orts enable rms to better serve consumers, the
private and social incentives generally di¤er for marketing innovations that gather
consumer information (Chen, 2006). There is thus a need for regulation on the col-
lection and protection of consumer data. European Unions General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR), implemented on May 25, 2018, represents a major e¤ort in this
regard. Its key requirements include Pseudonymization or full anonymization where
appropriate, and explicit, informed consent for the use of personal data. GDPR im-
www.javelinstrategy.com.
14There is an extensive literature on the economics of consumer privacy. See, for example, Acquisti,
Taylor and Wagman, 2016; Taylor 2006; and Taylor and Wagman, 2014.
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poses sever penalty for violations: a violator may be ned up to e20 million or up
to 4% of the annual worldwide turnover of the preceding nancial year in case of an
enterprise, whichever is greater.
The strong regulatory protection of personal data is not without cost. In partic-
ular, it may reduce rms incentive to serve customers. For example, immediately
following the implementation of GDPR, more than 1,000 U.S. websites blocked ac-
cess from European visitors. Apparently, rms are concerned with the liability from
non-compliance, which may motivate them to reduce output or even exit the mar-
ket. Firms will also incur additional costs for data protection in order to comply
with the regulation, which can also lead to decreases in output. The di¢culty for
achieving optimal regulation on data protection also arises because preference for pri-
vacy di¤ers across countries. According to a survey in 2018, about 60% of consumers
in the United States and Spain are data pragmatists, who would consider whether
the service is worth the information requested, but such users comprise only 40%
in Germany and the Netherlands. The survey also nds that a larger percentage
of consumers in the European countries surveyed are data fundamentalists, who are
unwilling to provide personal information, than consumers in the United States.15
A strong standard on data protection across countries may thus result in excessive
protection in some countries but insu¢cient protection in others.
Consumer data protection also interacts with competition policy. For example, a
major company such as Amazon sells products both by itself and by independent
sellers on its platform. Amazon can obtain sales data of the independent sellers and
may potentially use such information to gain an (unfair) advantage, such as placing its
own wholesale orders for a product after the marketing e¤orts by an independent seller
has made the product popular, adversely impacting competition from the independent
15Global Alliance of Data-driven Marketing Association: http://www.globaldma.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/Global-data-privacy-report-FINAL.pdf.
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seller. The information may also a¤ect competition between Amazon as a retailer
with the third-party sellers it hosts. In July 2019, the European Commission opened
an investigation into possible anti-competitive conduct of Amazon. As part of the
investigation, the Commission will focus on whether and how the use of marketplace
seller data by Amazon a¤ects competition. Also related is the issue of potential
tracations for data. For instance, data from third parties may be more valuable to
small rms which, unlike their larger counterparts, may have more limited direct
access to consumer information. Regulations that prohibit or limit data trading,
while desirable from the perspective of protecting consumer privacy, can enlarge the
asymmetry of competitive positions among competitors at the expense of smaller
rms.
Another important issue concerning policies on data and privacy is how they may
a¤ect product innovation. One concern is that strong privacy protection will hinder
rms e¤orts to learn about consumer preferences, and to the extent that such in-
formation is often needed for product innovation, regulations on consumer privacy
protection will impede innovation. However, privacy policy can also impact con-
sumers willingness to share information. In particular, if consumers believe that
there is strong privacy protection, they are more likely to permit the use of their
information by rms. Stringent privacy regulation can thus enable rms to commit
to strong protection of consumer data, which leads to more information sharing from
consumers and in turn is conducive to innovation. Therefore, the relationship between
privacy protection and innovation is likely to be non-monotonic, and an increase in
privacy protection can facilitaterather than impedeinnovation.
5. CONCLUSION
Digital technologies and the Internet have profoundly changed how markets func-
tion. The drastically reduced costs in search, transportation, reproduction, and entry
20
o¤er tremendous new opportunities for higher market e¢ciency. At the same time,
the increasing importance of platforms, innovation, and consumer data poses new
challenges on e¤ective competition, IP protection, and consumer privacy in the digi-
tal economy. Drawing insights from recent research in industrial economics, this paper
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